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PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM IN BRAZILIAN  
FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA



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MUNGER AFRICANA LIBRARY NOTES

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Issue #23

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PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM IN BRAZILIAN  
FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Professor Roy Glasgow

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FRONT COVER: Three giraffes in a prehistoric landscape?  
The rectangles may represent areas of  
early iron-age cultivation and the white  
rounded objects boulders. Majenje, Matapos.  
African Arts, Spring 1969, page 45. "Rock  
Paintings of Southern Africa," by H. C.  
Woodhouse.



## Introduction

While visiting Brazil's Northeast in 1947, I was impressed by the strong African cultural flavor which prevailed there. This impression increased when, after a matter of hours flying to the West Coast of Africa, I realized that the cultural flavor I had felt in Brazil was, indeed, authentic, and the two regions seemed much less than an ocean apart. Traveling a more southerly route in 1971, I found little evidence of this ethnic link between Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro. In its place a political and economic pragmatism predominated, as conceived by both the South African and the Brazilian establishments.

While in Rio I spoke with Candido Mendes, who, in the interim between my two visits, had been largely responsible for the new Africa policy in the Quadros Cabinet. While his plans for Brazilian leadership in the Third World did not reach fruition due to the fall of Quadros' regime, and policy subsequently moved more towards economic expediency and away from ideology, the cultural and philosophical identification with black Africa has not disappeared entirely. For instance, some of the most interesting research on Nigerian history is being done in Brazil. During our meeting in Rio, Mendes and I concurred that the Africa policy had finally been established somewhere between the cultural and political extremes.

Relatively little research to date has been done on Brazilian policy in regard to Africa, although Brazil has the highest percentage of black people in South America.<sup>1</sup> Interest in Brazil throughout the Pan African world is clearly increasing. The Ivory Coast, for example,<sup>2</sup> asked Brazil to intercede with Portugal over Guiné-Bissau.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Nigerian

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<sup>1</sup> See South American Handbook, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. This source gives the percentage of "Negro" as 15 percent and of "mulatto-mestizo" as another 25 percent, although the terms are often used in an invidious manner and the figures are less than precise.

<sup>2</sup> Article in West Africa (London), November 12, 1973.

Commissioner for External Affairs, during his visit to Brasilia in 1974, issued a statement which underlined the principles of "self-determination and independence."<sup>3</sup> Another article in The Afro-American indicated black American interest in the cooling of Brazil's relationship with Portugal.<sup>4</sup>

There is an opposite side, however, to Brazilian Africa policy. South African industrialist, Louis Luyt, proposes to build a fertilizer factory in Brazil. The initial investment is on the order of \$15,000,000, which is expected to increase to over \$30,000,000. The new company, Fertchem, has been approved by the South African Reserve Bank for the foreign exchange. According to the Rand Daily Mail, the plant is expected to earn South Africa some \$8,000,000 a year in foreign exchange.<sup>5</sup> Another example of South African investment on a smaller scale in Brazil is the Johannesburg company, Micrographix, which has helped to set up the Brazilian company, Comnicromation.<sup>6</sup>

Professor Roy Glasgow of Boston University was invited to present his views of present day Brazilian thinking on southern Africa. Dr. Glasgow was born in the country of Trinidad and Tobago. He taught English and history there, and then took a B. A. and M. A. in economics and political science at Howard University. He earned his doctorate in International Relations and Latin American Affairs at American University. He has also studied at the University of North Carolina and at the University of Lisbon (1969). He has traveled widely throughout Latin America and Europe, doing field research in Brazil in 1968, 1970, and 1972, the latter on a Ford Foundation Study-Travel Fellowship. Professor Glasgow has also worked on the cultural problems

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<sup>3</sup> The Afro-American, December 4-8, 1973.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in West Africa, February 11, 1974.

<sup>5</sup> Johannesburg, Rand Daily Mail, July 27, 1973.

<sup>6</sup> Johannesburg, The Star, August 4, 1973.

of Africans and East Indians in Guyana.<sup>7</sup> While living in Portugal, he studied its relations with Angola and gathered research material for a forthcoming book on Queen Nzinga (1582-1663) and Angolan resistance to Portuguese rule. He has lectured widely on Brazilian history and politics and has published many articles and monographs relating to Africa and Brazil.


Dr. Glasgow's initial statement is based upon a paper he gave at the 1973 African Studies Association Meeting in Syracuse, New York. For the purposes of this NOTE, two members of the American Universities Field Staff, Dr. Thomas Sanders and Manon Spitzer, were invited to comment on Professor Glasgow's analysis. Dr. Sanders is a Senior Associate of the Field Staff and the author of numerous Reports on Brazil, Chile, and Columbia. He was formerly a professor at Brown University and has lived periodically in Brazil since the 1950s. Manon Spitzer is the Editor of the AUFS Reports. She did graduate work on South Africa at the University of Wisconsin, where she also studied Xhosa. Subsequently, she spent eighteen months in West Africa and lived the greater part of 1972 in Brazil.

E. S. M.

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<sup>7</sup>Glasgow, Roy, Guyana: Race and Politics Among Africans and East Indians. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

# BRAZILIAN TRADE WITH SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES



NIGERIA	import	Knitting Machines	22
	export	Films, Fabrics, Leather	22
SOUTH AFRICA	import	Metals, Minerals, Textiles	10
	export	Coffee, Brown Sugar, Timber	30
ANGOLA	import	Wood Pulp	10
	export	Newsprint, Household Appliances	10
GHANA	import	Meat, Flour	10
	export	Rice	10
LIBERIA	import		
	export	Cargo Vessels, Mutton	10

1972 statistics

Map by Linda McKnight  
and Caltech Graphic Arts

## PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Recent Brazilian foreign policy in Southern Africa has reflected strands of realism and to some extent idealism. Since the beginning of independence in 1822, Brazilian foreign ministers have pursued policies that were realistic and sometimes idealistic with an acute awareness of geopolitical and commercial opportunities. For example, the logic of Brazilian diplomacy during the first empire (1822-31) was concentrated on gaining diplomatic recognition for the young nation, particularly from Great Britain and the United States.<sup>1</sup> The price of recognition was the abolition of the slave trade, a moral goal, conflicting with Brazilian economic reality, but which was eventually accomplished in 1852.<sup>2</sup> In the second empire (1841-89), pragmatism characterized the diplomacy with Great Britain and Argentina in the Plata region. Brazilian diplomacy during the first republic (1889-1930) was dedicated to "the policy of the frontiers," adjusting territorial disputes with neighbouring Latin American countries and deepening relations with the United States (then, as well as now, her chief market for coffee). During World Wars I and II, Brazil expanded her diplomatic representation in Europe, Asia and the League of Nations, while actively participating in the reinforcement of the Inter-American system.<sup>3</sup>

The point of interest in the above is that Brazilian governments pursued foreign policies with moderation, prudence and a sharp eye towards justice and moral sanctions. The juxtaposition of pragmatism and idealism has sometimes sorely tested and conflicted with national interests. Once these tensions surface, it is pragmatism that emerges as the dominant factor in Brazilian foreign policy.

Brazil's Southern African strategy is a case in point, posing a dilemma not only for Brazil, but for South Africa, Portugal and the independent states of Black Africa. It represents an attempt



to walk a diplomatic tight rope between the anti-segregationist, anti-colonial and pro-independent policies of Black Africa, the segregationist policies of South Africa, the colonial policies of Portugal in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné and the developmental security and moral interests of the new Brazilian foreign policy.

Since the late Cearense, President Castelo Branco, enunciated the new Brazilian foreign policy in his first speech at the Institute Rio Branco in 1964,<sup>4</sup> Brazilian foreign policy has undergone few fundamental changes. The leitmotiv, then as well as now, is still the increase of national power and the attainment of great power status through rapid economic and social development with non-ideological trade as an important lever. Opposition to communism, in Latin America and Africa, is an important vehicle of this strategy.

Perhaps at this point, it might be appropriate to briefly analyse the background and political philosophy of the Brazilian military government. By the time the generals had seized power in 1964, brasilitarismo, the concept whereby generals and civilians united for purposes of national greatness through development, had become an established part of military thinking. The 1953 charter of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), or the Superior War College, decreed its mission as preparing civilians and the military for advisory and executive functions in the institutions that plan, develop and execute policies of national security.<sup>5</sup> Civilian participation was a major part of the ESG's curriculum which gave the military civilian support among leaders who shared many of their ideas on development and security. The camaraderie and confidence which developed from their association were important ingredients in the consensual formulation of a national and diplomatic policy that argued for the utilization of domestic and foreign resources to develop Brazil, and to help the United States and the Western powers to resist the inroads of communism. Thus, the international arena was seen as divided into two irreconcilable blocs between which war was inevitable. Continuing, they stated that Brazil should trade with Africa, India, China, and should support Portugal in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné.

Since 1972, some of these basic premises have been undermined

or disproved by the Kissinger and Nixon principles of five centers of world power--the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan and China--and the Nixon rapprochement with China. Peace in Viet Nam is not viewed as an international detente between East and West but merely as a truce in the Cold War which will be exploited by the communists to supply aid to populist regimes, left-wing and ultranationalist movements in Africa and Latin America.

Recent Brazilian military preoccupation with Southern Africa supports this analysis, as an important sector of military opinion believes that if the moderating influence of Portugal were to be hastily removed from Angola, Mozambique and Guiné, the African continent would be subverted by communism. Addressing the Foreign Relations Committee of the Brazilian Congress in Brasilia in August 1972, Portuguese Colonel Hermes Araújo de Oliveira, said that a military alliance between Brazil, Portugal, and South Africa for the defense of the South Atlantic was essential. The Portuguese colonel argued that inasmuch as the western powers had virtually abandoned the South Atlantic in favor of the North Atlantic region, Brazil should join forces in a military alliance with Portugal and South Africa for the preservation of Western civilization. An identical position was advanced by South African military commander, Admiral Bierman, writing in Paratus, the journal of the South African armed forces. Bierman stated that a regional treaty should be pursued with vigor. He called for super power involvement in the Southern Hemisphere to combat the communist menace. This position is consistent with that of the Africanos faction in Portugal who do not want to change the status quo in the colonies and seek closer relations with South Africa.

This appealing position finds ready support among two elite groups in Brasilia, (1) the Brazilian Ministry of Trade, who argues that trade problems can be solved within a Southern African trading bloc (the Portuguese colonies and South Africa), and (2) the instinctive geopolitical assessments of the Brazilian military which speak of our African frontier ("nossa fronteira africana"). That is to say, West Africa and the Portuguese colonies are now the strategic bulwarks of the Brazilian military defense. The Brazilian frontier now extends to Western and Southern Africa, a strategy that has found ready allies in South Africa and Portugal.

Accordingly, the recent Brazilian military mission (army, airforce and naval officers) which travelled through Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya, all safely conservative countries, was assessing the capabilities and intentions of these countries, presumably as a bastion of defense against communisation (read radicalism) of the continent. Such a dreaded realization is viewed as presenting an almost suicide or surrender dilemma to South Africa, Portugal and peripherally Brazil.

The present Brazilian military's preoccupation with planning for the "worst case," and their need to justify their continuing in power and the purchase of new weapons, has led to some military "involvement" in the Portuguese colonies. The leaders of the major African guerrilla movements have come close to outright condemnation of Brazil's role in Portuguese Africa. Agostinho Neto, President of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, declared that Brazilian influence in Southern Africa will not have a salutary long-range effect, leading to the evolution of conditions in Portuguese Africa and South Africa. Members of the Partido Africano de Independencia de Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) contacted opposition elements in Brazil concerning possible Brazilian military involvement in Guiné-Bissau. Brazilian military officers dressed in Portuguese uniforms were detected in Guiné and Cabo Verde in November 1972.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, opposition eavesdroppers in Portugal reported that Lisbon had suggested that Brazil should establish a joint naval base in the Cape Verde Islands, an area which, like West and Southern Africa, lies within the Brazilian strategic semi-circle of defense.<sup>10</sup> Such an undertaking, based on a hard-boiled assessment of strategic realities would satisfy the Brazilian general staff, some of whose naval planners have long argued that a PAIGC government in Guiné could offer such a base to the Soviet Union, thus jeopardizing the security of the entire South Atlantic.

On the other hand, were Brazil to attempt to develop a military presence in Africa, it would irreparably damage Brazilian credibility and usefulness, not only in Africa, but in Asia as well. Conservative as well as non-conservative African governments would condemn her for stymieing PAIGC's path to independence. But such, obviously, is not the intention of Brazilian diplomacy, at least for the present. For her military planners who visited



Africa in 1972 to investigate the situation first hand saw no reason to become militarily involved. However, in spite of pressures from Lisbon for active political and/or even military support in Africa, the significant absence of any reference to Africa in the Médici-Caetano communique signed in Portugal, March 1973, indicates that, for the moment, Brazil sees no reason to make a military and/or political commitment.

Clearly Brazil must opt for a different approach to the complex problems of West and Southern Africa, since she cannot give her growing economic and military strength to one or the other of the protagonists in that area. An approach which combines realism and typical Brazilian idealism. One possibility is that as leader of a Portuguese speaking bloc of nations, she can act as a midwife to an Afro-Luso-Brazilian community with close, cool and proper ties to South Africa.<sup>11</sup> There is some evidence to support the argument that many of the military and mulatto elites in the colonies feel culturally closer to Brazil than to Portugal.<sup>12</sup> Portuguese commander-in-chief in Mozambique, General Caulza de Arriaga, has voiced discontent with Lisbon making it clear that his preferences were for a Brazilian rather than a Rhodesian solution.<sup>13</sup> Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa stated while visiting Africa in November 1972 that Brazil was prepared to act as mediator between Portugal and the guerrillas. A Brazilian solution--preparation of the Portuguese colonies for independence inside an Afro-Luso-Brazilian community--could have a moderating and less inflexible development on political and social patterns there. Thus, by being the major power inside of an Afro-Luso-Brazilian community, Brazil could transform conditions from the inside (transformação por dentro). Such a possibility, if realized, would presumably affect South Africa, simultaneously satisfying her major security concerns.

Influencing conditions in the Portuguese colonies and in South Africa from the inside would be possible, it is argued, through the development of functional ties. Conceivably, through commercial and capital investments, the world's largest Portuguese speaking nation could be a pioneer in the modernization of race relations in Angola, Mozambique, Guiné, and South Africa.<sup>14</sup> An examination of this strategy in terms of its economic rationale, feasibility and present developments is appropriate at this point.

The imperatives of Brazilian economic realities with its

developmental internationalist and great power thrust caused Brazilians to step down from their general isolation and to realize that their exports, particularly sugar, coffee and cocoa would have to become more competitive in world markets. Brazil will have to create and develop cooperative institutional arrangements with other countries of the tropical Atlantic World--Black Africa, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. In short their commendable profile of manufactured industries, assisted by a large flow of private foreign capital, created, in part, an export mentality and a new internationalism among Brazilians.<sup>15</sup>

This new posture presents both an opportunity and a problem for the planners from Itamarity (Ministry of Foreign Relations), a competent, professional, and sophisticated (read European) diplomatic corps functioning in the traditional North Atlantic mold--friend of the United States, mediator and international status. Regardless of the economic and political merits of Brazilian involvement in Southern Africa--markets for Brazilian exports, prestige and big power status inside a probable Afro-Luso-Brazilian community and a "special" relationship with South Africa and moderate African countries, the approach holds great perils for Brazil which cannot be ignored by partly pretending that they do not exist or by engaging in nebulous diplomatic language.

Brazilian influence and prestige will depend on her ability to satisfy Black Africa, Portugal and South Africa that she can be fair and impartial to their disparate aspirations and goals. South African apartheid has been condemned by Brazil who maintains relations at the legation level, relations that are described as "correct and proper." The largest Latin American nation while condemning apartheid has stated that isolation of the South African regime will merely aggravate and consolidate the racial conditions. The Vorster government has suggested an upgrading of relations but the suggestion was turned down.<sup>16</sup> In adopting an independent fence-straddling position between the disparate African factions, Brazil hopes to pursue realistic diplomacy to encourage economic growth.<sup>17</sup>

Meanwhile Brazilian diplomacy is being subjected to severe and conflicting pressures from within and without. The Ministry of Finance, under Delfim Neto, obviously measuring South Africa's

economic potential, anticipates minimal commercial mileage from Black Africa, and is pressing Itamarity to cement closer ties with the Southern African countries. On the other hand, an anti-Portuguese United Nations General Assembly has called on Portugal to open negotiations with the leaders of the guerrilla movements, while the more militant African leaders have stipulated that she (Brazil) should also dialogue with the guerrilla leaders. The Brazilian response has been negative, which led one African diplomat to comment that the time "was ripe" for Brazil to state her intentions. "It [Brazil] cannot have access to the Portuguese colonies and the rest of the African nations at the same time. It is one or the other."<sup>18</sup> The Nairobi Daily Nation of November 1972 sharply criticized Brazil for its lack of understanding for the African fight against imperialism. The South American nation has cleverly side-stepped the issue by its pious insistence on the principal principles of its foreign policy--non-intervention and self-determination. Interestingly these principles do not seem to apply to countries bordering Brazil which are undergoing a surreptitious process of satellization. For it was Brazilian intervention against the left-wing government of Juan Torres in 1971 in Bolivia that was responsible for the coup d'etat which placed conservative General Banzer in the presidential office.<sup>19</sup>

While South African-Brazilian diplomatic representation is at a low level, this fact might be less important than the uses that it serves. In South Africa's attempt to redraw the political contours of the South Atlantic, Brazil is seen as a pivotal force, an important factor in South Africa's dialogue plans. This does not mean, of course, that Portugal is less important. It simply means that Brazil is in a more advantageous position, not only because of an absence of an imperialist tradition,<sup>20</sup> but because of her large African population and Portuguese cultural ties, valuable assets in any dialogue with Black Africa.

In December 1972, Pretoria recalled W. S. Van Heesden, who is now in charge of African policy, and replaced him with Minister Plenipotentiary, A.J.F. Viljoen, former head of the African Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria. This move seems to suggest not only the importance Pretoria places on its Brazilian representation but the close relationship between its African and Brazilian policies. But the power realisms of South



Africa's "southern strategy" does not end with Brazil but rather extends to Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, countries which, with the exception of Uruguay, have in varying degrees constitutional or legal prohibitions against the entry of non-white immigrants.

Slowly and inexorably, South Africa is neutralizing her "pariah status" among some Northern Hemispheric states by forging and attempting to forge special relationships with certain Southern Hemispheric nations as a response to the strategic, political and infrastructural changes taking place in the Southern Hemisphere, but specifically in Southern Africa and elsewhere in Africa. It is the harmonizing and harnessing of this power potential among the Southern Hemisphere's European states that form the basis of South Africa's policies.

For if we accept Stalin's definition of states as land or sea animals and Africa as a land animal, it follows that Africa might still be vulnerable to foreign naval power today as she was in the days of the early Portuguese explorers. Almost invulnerable to the land forces of Black Africa, South Africa must develop the last dimension of southern power, naval power, in the oceans which surround her. The power realism of Brazil and South Africa, and to some extent Argentina and Australia, is sharpened by the vacuum created by British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and its partial replacement by Russia's growing presence there and off the coast of the Republic of Guinea, protecting guerrilla sanctuaries.<sup>21</sup> The uncertain realities of the Afro-Asian world and apprehension over America's decision that it cannot continue to be the world's sole policeman require the concern of new architects of new power.

Brasilia and Pretoria realize that the process of solving the problems of regional cooperation would be long and difficult. While Argentina and Brazil share some of the basic premises of South Africa's security preoccupations, they are reluctant, at this point, to commit themselves, and so reduce their options, to any cooperative, collective, regional, self-policing force, as Pretoria's recent naval delegation to Brasilia and Buenos Aires has discovered.

Although naval planners from the two South American countries visited Pretoria, it is in the areas of commerce and trade that functional lines of cooperation have been developing. The core question

confronting Brazilian diplomats and planners was whether Brazil could afford to ignore her most powerful African neighbour. Foreign Minister, Mário Bigson Barbosa, on the eve of his visit to Africa in November 1972 declared that Brazil could not afford to ignore "South Africa as an important country for commercial relations,"<sup>22</sup> particularly as she has the highest standard of living after the United States among the European nations with a 5.5% annual growth rate. With 26.2% of total GNP for Africa, South Africa has the most potential for capital formation and is an important potential importer of Brazilian exports. In 1971, Brazil exports to South Africa amounted to \$16.8 million, while imports totalled \$2.8 million. While the trade deficit is widening due to increasing trade ties between the two countries, President of the Bank of Brazil, Nestor Jost, visiting Pretoria in January sought to assure South African banking officials of the large market potential in Brazil for their exports, particularly in food, agricultural products as well as civil construction, chemical products and capital goods.<sup>23</sup> The recent opening in Brazil of Barclay's<sup>24</sup> National Bank of South Africa is with the object of boosting trade.

The policy of the "open door" along commercial and functional lines has led to establishment (1969) of a direct flight between Johannesburg and Rio-de-Janeiro by South African Airways which recently signed an agreement with Aerolines Argentinas for a direct once a week flight between Argentina and South Africa. The two airlines have linked up with Quantas, providing a connection over the South Pole with South Africa and South America. These activities were capped by the recent visit of South African Foreign Minister, Hillgard Muller, to Argentina. The Argentine state shipping line has just started a regular steamship service with modern fast freighters to South Africa and West African ports. Other areas of recent agreement include the proposed establishment of a new company called MARASA, a combination of Mar Argentina, S. A., and two South African concerns, Rentmeester Beleggings and William Barendts. When completed both parties claim that it will be the largest fishing fleet in the Southern Hemisphere.

Meanwhile, Brazil has convinced Colombia, Ivory Coast, and Angola, who together produce 60% of the world's coffee, to establish a multi-national company to control market supply prices. This new company, which will give market control to producers, will buy and market coffee from the farmers, maintaining a system of quotas. Sugar production is another area where Brazilian diplomats have

found it necessary to submerge ideological differences by holding discreet discussions with Cuban experts in London and Madrid in order to present a united front in the forthcoming international sugar agreements in Geneva. The Instituto do Açúcar e do Alcool is also making contact with Australia and would like to include South Africa with its one million ton surplus. Inclusion of the latter, however, is fraught with uncertainty since Cuba and presumably the new labor government in Australia might not accept Pretoria.

Commercial relations is obviously well worth looking into despite the growing crescendo of negative Black African opinion. The choices facing the military government are those faced by any country that attempts to give a balance to idealism and realism. Brazil could adopt at least five attitudes and policies toward South Africa. She could (1) favor isolation with hostility and worldwide sanctions, (2) openly aid one side or the other, (3) attempt to conciliate the protagonists, or (4) trade and internal transformation (transformação por dentro).<sup>25</sup> There might be a fifth option: non-involvement. Actually this is self-defeating if the object is to remain neutral since non-involvement helps the stronger protagonist.<sup>26</sup>

The generals in Brasilia have opted for option four which is a form of intervention, albeit passive and marginal. Any other option with the exception of (3) would paralyze international trade, making it a hostage of racial, religious, political, and economic differences.<sup>27</sup> But if we give an unqualified yes to the persuasive premises of the above, does it not presuppose that the growing polarization in Southern Africa can be arrested, and if so by whom? Would moderate as well as radical African nations demand a quid pro quo from Brazil, and South Africa, failing which positions would harden? A high official in the Kennedy government, former Undersecretary of State George Ball, remarked that Portugal was ultimately pursuing a dead-end course in Africa, which would lead to continued disorder, and disturbance, noisy disruption in the United Nations, and an embarrassing awkwardness in the Western alliance.<sup>28</sup> According to Julius Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanzania, conditions in Southern Africa were long past the state of polarization:

It is not the eleventh hour, it is already past the twelfth. The war underway is a class war, it is



a race war, it is an international war, and in each respect the sides currently line up the same way. The privileged, foreign, dominant white forces backed by investment, loans and credits and by military, governmental and white peoples in Europe and America are shooting, bombing, subjecting to the ravages of napalm and defoliants black African people in their traditional homelands in order to rule them, <sup>29</sup> exploit their labor and the riches of their land.

President Kenyatta of Kenya and his Foreign Minister skeptically questioned Brazil's intentions in Africa during Barbosa's visit, declaring that Brazilian policies should contribute to the end of colonialism in Africa and advance the independence of all African countries. <sup>30</sup> Kenyatta further asked Brazil to accelerate the process of decolonization.

If Black African attitudes and policies are slowly hardening, is the Brazilian approach of isolation (read "correct" and "cool") inside bilateral relations with South Africa feasible? Since the premises upon which this policy is based argue that neither sanctions nor isolation could paralyze a nation disposed to realise its destiny, a policy of transformação por dentro might be a workable one. While it is not a recipe for a dramatic political breakthrough, in my judgment it would extend the areas of economic and political involvement between countries, ultimately passing beyond these <sup>31</sup> matters into social and political changes inside South Africa. It is this judicious combination of realism and idealism that characterizes Brazil's Southern African diplomacy.

Resisting the temptation to seek spectacular short cuts which could lead to serious miscalculations in Brazil and Black Africa, the military government believes that it is illusory to expect that the industrial world would break economic relations with South Africa over apartheid. Furthermore, Black Africa neither has the economic dynamism nor the military capability to match South Africa. So while it is not certain that any approach will have the desired results--elimination of apartheid and independence for the colonies--pragmatism and idealism at least provide the prospect of an acceptable process of influencing and transforming internal

conditions in Southern Africa.

It would appear that many African countries cognizant of the real disequilibria that exist between the Southern tip and the remainder of the continent are disposed to engage in the politics of dialogue and peace with South Africa. Pretoria has reciprocated. These developments are viewed by Brazilian diplomats as a vindication of their foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps it is too soon to say if this represents a growing trend or is merely a historical accident or fad, soon to fade away as so many innovations.

## FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The Obá (King) of Benim and his vassal, the Obá Ajan, of Onim (city of Lagos) were two of the first sovereigns to recognize the independence of Brazil through the efforts of Colonel Manuel Alves de Lima. Jornal do Brasil, 15 de set. de 1972, "Politica globalista leva agora Gibson a diálogo com a Africa."
- <sup>2</sup> Leslie Bethel. The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
- <sup>3</sup> E. Bradford Burns. "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 9 (April, 1967), 195-212.
- <sup>4</sup> Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. A Diplomacia da Revolução Brasileira. (Rio-de-Janeiro: Ministro das Relações Exteriores, 1964).
- <sup>5</sup> Alfred Stepan. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 176.
- <sup>6</sup> "Brazil: military rethink," Latin America, 6/1/73, Vol. VII, No. 22, 172.
- <sup>7</sup> O Globo, 17 de agosto, 1972.
- <sup>8</sup> Interview (hereinafter cited as Interview) with a Brazilian official with close ties to Itamaraty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 1972. This official who kindly permitted me to record his views, requested that he remain anonymous.
- <sup>9</sup> Latin America, Vol. VI, No. 26.
- <sup>10</sup> Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and the Independence of Sub-Saharan

Africa: A Bibliographic Survey," Current Themes in African Historical Studies: A Selected Bibliographical Guide to Resources for Research in African History, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1970, 379.

<sup>11</sup>Roy A. Glasgow, "Recent Observations on the Developing Southern Strategy of Brazil, Portugal and Africa," Issue, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall, 1972), 6.

<sup>12</sup>Mário Antonio Fernandes de Oliveira, Influencias da Literatura Brasileira sobre as literaturas Portugueses do Atlantico tropical (Lisbon: Instituto Superior de Ciencias Sociais e Politica Ultramarina, 1967), 8, 9.

<sup>13</sup>Latin America, Vol. VI, No. 26.

<sup>14</sup>Eric N. Baklanoff, "Brazilian Development and the International Economy," by John Saunders (ed.), Modern Brazil: New Patterns of Development (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971), 190-214.

<sup>15</sup>Brady Tyson, "Foreign Policy of Brazil," in H. E. Davis and Larman Wilson (eds.), Foreign Policies of Latin American States, forthcoming Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>16</sup>Canadian Forum, March 1973.

<sup>17</sup>Jornal do Brasil, 28 de agosto de 1972, "As relações inibidas com a Africa do Sul." Early in 1973, Itamarity introduced an "aggressive" training course for Brazilian diplomats on the Brazilian economy and commercial exports. The principal lecturers were Delfim Neto of the Ministry of Finance, Gibson Barbosa of Itamarity and Pratim de Moraes of Industry and Commerce. See Estado de Sao Paulo, 25 de fev. de 1973.

<sup>18</sup>Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 1972.

<sup>19</sup>Latin America, Vol. VII.

<sup>20</sup> This lack of a colonial tradition is more a matter of chance than design as the last Brazilian governor in Angola, Joaquim Inácio Lima, 1821-22, with numerous Brazilian residents in Luanda unsuccessfully tried to seize the colony for the newly independent Brazil. See De Oliveira, op. cit., 8-9, and José Honório Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

<sup>21</sup> Times of the Americas, April 11, 1973, states that the Soviets "have strengthened their fleet on the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic is full of Russian fishing fleets and their protective naval escorts." Concern is, of course, further heightened since most of the western world's oil passes around the Cape of Good Hope since the closing of the Suez Canal.

<sup>22</sup> Jornal do Brasil, 28 de agosto de 1972.

<sup>23</sup> The Star, January 10, 1972.

<sup>24</sup> By way of comparison, Brazil's trade with Nigeria rose from \$2.4 million in 1971, and with Zaire, her exports hardly totalled \$100,000 while imports were \$2.85 million.

<sup>25</sup> Interview in August 1972 in Rio-de-Janeiro.

<sup>26</sup> George Modalski, "The International Relations of Internal War," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 23-24.

<sup>27</sup> Jornal do Brasil, 28 de agosto de 1972.

<sup>28</sup> George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern Structure (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1968), 245.

<sup>29</sup> Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, second session, February 2, 3, 1972. Economic Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain.



<sup>30</sup>Jornal do Brasil, 20 de nov. de 1972, "Gibson afirma a Kenyatta que Brasil nao discriminam."

<sup>31</sup>Brazilian diplomats cite the Afrikaners' long history of battle against a hostile environment. See Jornal do Brasil, 28 de agosto de 1972.

<sup>32</sup>Interview in Rio-de-Janeiro, August 1972.

## COMMENT

Manon L. Spitzer

It is undeniable that Brazil's Southern African policy, particularly as it relates to South Africa, presents a dilemma to the ministers at Itamarity. Brazil's ambition is to move economically into all of Africa. South Africa is the logical objective for a major thrust because it is economically the most powerful country on the continent at the present time. Its consumer market, even among the black majority, is comparatively well developed, a natural target for a growing range of Brazilian exports. Nonetheless, Brazil is reluctant to exchange what might become short-term advantages in a ready market for exclusion from trade with African countries outside the white-dominated south.

Brazil has asserted that it engages in "nonideological trade," justifying its position by reference to the ineffectual nature of economic boycotts against countries which are "disposed to realize" their destiny. While Brazil's ministers are currently concerned with Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese colonies, they might strengthen their pragmatic argument by adding the examples of China and Cuba.

As a somewhat inconsistent corollary to its assertion for nonideological trade, Brazil has also advanced the theory that its trade with South Africa can transform that country's social and political conditions from within (transformação por dentro). Can such a theory be effectively implemented in foreign policy? Is it, as Mr. Glasgow states, a valid combination of pragmatism and idealism which provides "the prospect of an acceptable process of influencing and transforming" the internal situation in South Africa? Or is transformação por dentro a calculated exercise in Brazilian realpolitik, a superficially pious public statement designed to placate national leaders among potential black African trading partners like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, or Kenya?

Neither Mr. Glasgow nor Brazilian spokesmen offer evidence to

demonstrate implementation of this aspect of Brazil's foreign policy. Where are the diplomatic initiatives, trade agreements, or informal communications--such as in the realm of culture or athletics--that would make transformação por dentro credible? One must conclude that Brazil's "southern strategy," unlike South Africa's, rests solely upon considerations of economic advantage. If the policy-makers at Itamaraty have indeed given serious thought to the possible social and political consequences of intensive trade between South Africa and Brazil, they would find themselves in agreement with Mr. Herbert W. Vilakazi's views expressed at the African Studies Association's annual meeting in Syracuse, New York, November 2, 1973.\*

South Africa has over the past two decades successfully diversified its economy so that by practically any measure it must be counted among the growing number of middle-range, modern, industrialized nations. It has achieved this status while maintaining social and political apartheid, the rigid separation of peoples of African, Indian, or Malayan descent from those of European stock. Has South Africa inadvertently weakened its potential for maintaining apartheid indefinitely by including large numbers of the African majority in the industrialization process? Have the unintended consequences of economic development opened the way for social and political change in the long run?

To admit even this possibility, as Mr. Vilakazi has done, suggests several new and potentially significant perspectives not only on South Africa's internal situation but also its trade relations with Brazil and other similarly industrialized states. Most important, it provokes the question, at least, whether South Africa's transition from a relatively hermetic economic system to membership in the community of industrialized nations will eventually cause it consciously to compromise apartheid in order to sustain its level of economic growth. It is conceivable that South Africa, having become dependent on an extensive network of international trade, will in the long run be constrained by the expectations of its dominant European-derived population to

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\*Herbert W. Vilakazi, "Social Change," a paper presented in the panel "South Africa 1948-1973: Apartheid After Twenty-five Years," November 2, 1973.

shift decision-making authority to a new group of technocrats, as indeed has occurred in Brazil. That consequently South Africa would become either more or less vulnerable to black African demands for revision of its social and political conditions is debatable.\* It does, however, expand the arena for discussions of South Africa's future beyond contemplation of physical confrontation between blacks and whites in all of Southern Africa.

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\*Brazil, of course, has also concentrated income in a small minority of the population, as a means of stemming inflation and maintaining economic growth by channeling resources to those who will invest them. In effect, income distribution in Brazil is as one-sided as in South Africa--the difference lies with the rationale. Indeed, Brazil receives considerable criticism for its failure to design policies to effect income redistribution. Finance Minister Delfim Neto argues that redistribution is accepted in principle, but the timing is crucial. South Africa is denied this neat "escape-hatch" by dividing its society on a racial basis. The parallels, however, should be obvious.

Professor Glasgow's reply:

As I've indicated, I do not think that the international system is thoroughly evil, selfish, or idealistic. While realism and power are undoubtedly the major characteristics of this policy, the Brazilian emphasis on form and appearance and their much vaunted need to preserve their ego-image of racial democracy introduces an element of idealism in the foreign policy equation, albeit a weak or peripheral one. While the emphasis has been largely on economic and security matters, there has been some emphasis on sports and cultural centers. I said some emphasis because the Brazilians are reluctant or appear to be reluctant of forging extremely close cultural ties with South Africa. One only has to look at the demographic makeup of the Portuguese nation to understand why.

Ms. Spitzer asks whether the policy of transformação por dentro is a "superficially pious public statement designed to placate national leaders among potential black African trading partners like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, or Kenya?" I cannot say one way or the other with any degree of real confidence. What little evidence I've seen suggests the contrary.



## COMMENT

Dr. Thomas Sanders

Professor Glasgow's excellent paper brings to attention the major tendencies and dilemmas of Brazilian policy in Africa.

The framework he adopts, however--that of a tension between idealism and pragmatism--confuses the orientation of the policy. In my judgment, idealism is not a factor in determining Brazilian actions, but rather what Glasgow calls pragmatism or what others call realism. One of the central problems of realism is to determine where national interests really lie, especially when apparent interests conflict, as they do in Africa, or when two sections of government, like the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Finance, perceive interests differently. The diplomatic tight-rope that currently characterizes Brazilian policy reflects the fact that Brazil would like to benefit from relationships with both Black Africa and with South Africa and Portugal. If changes should occur in the future--for example, a tilting in favor of Black Africa as a result of pressure from Arab oil-producing states--this would not stem from idealism, but rather from a reassessment of basic interests within a framework of pragmatism.

Professor Glasgow refers to the dualistic interpretation of the international conflict that underlays the analysis of the Escola Superior de Guerra and the five-power reinterpretation associated with Henry Kissinger. There is strong evidence that Brazil does not accept either but is now operating on the premise that in the near future other major powers will join the club and play determinative roles in international politics. The leading candidate as sixth power, according to this analysis, is Brazil. Policy in Africa will undoubtedly become even more important because of the geopolitical thinking that underlies Brazilian self-definition as the dominant nation of the South Atlantic. Furthermore, Brazil, while maintaining its strong anti-Communism stand, may give greater priority to considerations of commerce and "influence" in determining its policy.

At one point in his paper, Professor Glasgow adopts an interpretation that is questionable: Brazil was responsible for the coup that overthrew the Torres government in Bolivia. The coup is more easily explicable by internal forces in Bolivia, though Brazil undoubtedly sympathized with, and probably abetted the coalition behind, Colonel Banzer. Glasgow is, nevertheless, correct in recognizing the satellitization that has occurred in Bolivia, which up to this point has been chiefly economic.

Professor Glasgow's reply:

Brazilian statesmen and diplomats are no different from their counterparts elsewhere, particularly in the North Atlantic region. In their domestic and international struggle for power, certain objectives and goals are limited by ethics, mores, law, and capability, among other factors. What I want to say at this point is that moral scruples or ethics (defined as idealism in my essay) place certain normative injunctions or ethical constraints on the power objectives of states: protection of minorities, fair behavior, respect for international law, and repudiation of violence as a means of settling disputes. Of course, students of international politics must be careful in not attributing too much importance or too little importance to this variable.

Brazilian statesmen and diplomats justify their objectives and goals in selfless, moral, humanitarian, and legal terms. That is to say, there is an idealistic dimension to international ideals. The issues at this stage boil down to the following: What are the idealistic considerations of Brazilian foreign policy? Are these considerations a mask for some devious purposes or do they express genuine concern for Brazil's ego-image and conditions in Southern Africa? I do not believe the international system is thoroughly evil. I do believe that the overt racial policies of Portugal and South Africa are repugnant to Brazil. Furthermore, the Brazilian elite believes that Africans suffering from Western racism are susceptible to communist propaganda. Perhaps Brazilian involvement coupled with its racial image (only imagery I emphasize) effectively employed in Southern Africa can have a moderating long-term effect. Which brings us to the second part of the question. As a potential force in the South Atlantic, particularly with African countries, Brazilian leadership in this area of race relations can only further her objectives and goals. While evidence is not conclusive at this time, I do believe that idealism plays some role in her foreign policy.

Dr. Sanders' second contention on Brazil's being the sixth power in the future is shared by a sizable part of the military establishment. However, I was referring to conditions at the time of

writing. There is still a reluctance on the part of some North Atlantic states to take Brazil seriously. At the recent Brazilian trade exhibition in London, all of the British newspapers described the Portuguese-speaking nation as a Third World country, a label which Brazil shuns if not abhors. It does seem that the military believes in dualistic conflict by proxy.

Finally, Dr. Sanders is correct in stating that the coup is more explicable by Bolivian domestic conditions. What my statement intended to convey was that Brazil was deeply involved in the coup. Since internal pre-coup planning created a need for foreign intervention (subversion, foreign aid mediation) Brazilian encouragement and assistance were important for geopolitical considerations.

Q: Would you care to summarize the Quadros policy towards Africa and to comment on whether it was an aberration in Brazilian thinking, possibly propelled by romantic assumptions about the Third World and Quadros' possible leadership of it?

Glasgow: The Quadros policy towards Africa was a consequence of the industrial changes taking place in Brazilian society during the 1950s and early 1960s. Modernization not only affected the political and educational institutions but produced a cadre of populist politicians and writers such as Dr. Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, Adolfo Justo Bezerra de Menezes, and Gilberto Freyre among others who argued that Brazil should become an active participant, a new and aggressive force in world affairs. That is to say, Brazil should repudiate the classic diplomacy that José Honório Rodrigues describes as "a kind of pasteurized product, very pure, very white." Therefore, while one could argue that there was some deviance in the new Brazilian diplomacy, particularly in terms of Africa, it was an inevitable organic outgrowth of the above conditions. Then, as well as now, there is tremendous ignorance among educated people about Africa. As a matter of fact, there is a large reservoir of revulsion towards Africa. Some of this is based on a lack of knowledge and information about Africa.

With respect to the new diplomacy, Brazil, according to Quadros, was:

...the link, the bridge, between Africa and the West, since we are so intimately bound with both peoples. Insofar as we can give the nations of the black continent an example of complete absence of racial prejudice, together with successful proof of progress without undermining the principles of freedom, we shall be decisively contributing to the effective integration of an entire continent in a system to which we are attached by our philosophy and historic tradition.

-from Janio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, Oct. 1961.

Historical romanticism as well as pragmatism were characteristics of the Quadros policy, as he sought to align Brazil with the vibrant



aggressive nationalist policies of the Afro-Asian world for commercial and diplomatic reasons. Of course, African influence on Brazilian music, art, dress, food, language, and religion were positive factors for Brazil's African diplomacy.

Q: At one stage Gilberto Freyre, as a world-famous Brazilian author, visited Mozambique and, as you know, returned with what many thought was a "whitewash" of Portuguese policy. Do you agree? Is this generally accepted in Brazil today and has there been a residual effect on Brazilian thinking?

Glasgow: No! I do not agree with the Freyre thesis. I think it would be too repetitious to describe what is well known by members of this audience... Portuguese oppression, forced labor, brutality, and racism in Angola and Mozambique. Rather, I would like to comment briefly on the pernicious effects of the doctrine on Brazilian public opinion. The Freyre thesis of a non-racial Portuguese cultural community in Africa reinforced Brazil's carefully cultivated national and international ego-image of a racial democracy. This ego-image is nurtured by the particularistic and ascriptive Brazilian culture which forces blacks to miscegenate and adapt to the dominant moreno phenotype (read white) in order to become acceptable. That is to say, as long as blacks and to a large extent mulattoes lose their somatic norms or characteristics and inherit light or white skin, thin lips and nose, and "good" hair, they can become acceptable to the dominant elite. Within this context the definition of whiteness and negroness is different in Brazil from what it is in the United States. Abdias do Nascimento, Afro-Brazilian civil rights activist, dramatist, painter, and now Visiting Professor of Puerto Rican Studies in this country, summarizes the Brazilian racial policy as follows:

There exists an empire of whiteness, a corrupting and perverse ideology for the black. Its final objective is the extinction of the black in the Brazilian context; a subtle and hypocritical type of genocide that does not leave the mark of its crime.

Nascimento's position is not an isolated one among Afro-Brazilians, although it is at variance with the official doctrine of racial harmony

and democracy. It follows that the Freyre doctrine is very popular in Brazil, particularly among the middle and upper groups, since it reflects or rather "absolves" them from any moral responsibility for the many instances of racism depicted in the daily press and in magazines. This extraordinary amount of brainwashing (uma enorme operação de lavagem de cranio) has a dangerous effect for the future of race relations in that country, exculpating whites and placing the blame on blacks for their almost total low status position. The result is a mea culpa attitude based on alleged inferiority, incapacity, and irresponsibility of the Afro-Brazilian (Fernandez, 1968), thus reinforcing racism in the system.

Q: Are there "black" pressure groups in Brazil which might impinge on Brazilian policy? Is there an Africa constituency? Are people in the Northeast more conscious of Africa, perhaps for reasons of heritage or poverty, than in other parts of Brazil?

Glasgow: There are no black pressure groups in Brazil. I suspect that the reasons lie in the lack of political consciousness about Africa and the general low esteem in which Africa is held by the ruling elite. Nordestinos have more cultural consciousness and contacts with Africa because of the predominant African influence. Anthony Enahoro, Nigerian Minister of Information, on a visit to Salvador in September 1972, identified Nigerian influence in food, language, music, religion, and ate dishes which were identical to those served in his house in Nigeria while speaking in Yoruba with Afro-Brazilians. In spite of these cultural reminders in the Northeast, there are no African-Brazilian Cultural Societies devoted to the propagation of cultural ties between the two areas. This is sharp contrast to the myriad of Portuguese-Brazilian Cultural Clubs in the south which are powerful lobbying groups. Allied with the Portuguese consulates and embassy, these groups promote trade, and cultural contacts, and argue for the maintenance of the status quo in Africa.

Among non-black Brazilians there is a small African constituency revolving around intellectuals, newspapermen, and some politicians. Individually these persons have raised substantive questions about Brazil's "intimate ties of friendship" with Portugal and its deleterious effects on Third World relations. One of the first to question Brazil's relationships with the colonialism of "the most

backward in the world" was the Bahiano intellectual, Pimental Gomes, who supported the total independence of the African colonies. These individuals have little effect on African policy, largely due to the nature of foreign policy formation in Brazil.

Q: Does Brazilian presence at Third World gatherings, such as the recent one in Algiers, have much feedback on Brazilian press coverage of Africa or the formation of Brazilian policy?

Glasgow: Although Brazil was among the four Latin American countries which attended the first non-aligned conference in Belgrade in 1961, her major dailies--Jornal do Brasil and Estado do Sao Paulo--have only recently given prominence to coverage of Third World meetings.

Both newspapers gave extensive coverage to the Algiers conference of non-aligned nations, particularly the large Latin American presence, Cuba's charge of Brazilian intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, and the Jamaican and Guyanese offer of troops to the OAU to fight in Angola and Mozambique. While the world's largest Portuguese-speaking nation continues to identify its future development with Europe and the United States and eschews the Third World label, it realizes the importance of strategically attacking under-development globally. Consequently, Brazil is slowly trimming its sails to changing international circumstances. These changes could affect the international relations behavior of Brazil and the Spanish-American countries toward the Afro-Asian world.

As I pointed out above, the Brazilian elites did not identify with what they considered to be "the seeming backwardness and savagery of Africa" and the teeming millions of Asia. The presence of Brazil's leading African specialist, Vladimir Murtinko, in Algiers testifies to the importance Brazil now places on economic cooperation among developing countries. As long as these countries continue to strategize, develop, and coordinate their international economic policies to the realities of regional and global political and economic phenomena, they will continue to be relevant and important to Brazil.

Q: Your statement about General Branco taking over makes it sound like a purely military coup. Adhemar Barros, then

Governor of Sao Paulo, stresses that he and other civilian leaders went to Branco to ask him to form a joint military/civilian government. Was the civilian component significant in bringing about the new government?

Glasgow: It is difficult to respond to this question with any degree of preciseness. The key word is significant. One might argue that the civilian component was significant in the pre-coup planning not so much in terms of numbers but in terms of the high-level and influential anti-Goulistas involved, such as Ademar de Barros, Magalhaes Pinto, Carlos Lacerda, Cordeiro de Farias, and Nelson de Melo among politicians. Businessmen included Gilberto Huber, founder of IPES, the Institute of Research and Social Studies, a political think tank, and Dr. De Paiva, consultant to several U.S. multinational corporations.

With General Goulbery Couto e Silva who served as IPES' executive secretary between 1961-64 and who was their link with the armed forces, Huber and De Paiva organized, financed, and coordinated anti-government activities creating economic chaos, blocking the legislative efforts of the Goulistas, fomenting discontent, strikes, acts of terrorism, and fear of communism. It was these conditions, plus the irresponsible actions of President Goulart and his advisers, rather than the importunings of civilian politicians, which were responsible for the military coup d'etat. Further, the intervention of the Latin American military in the political process was and is always encouraged by some sectors of the civilian population. This does not give a civilian quality to an essentially unconstitutional golpe do estado.

On the other hand, General Carlos Luis Guedes, leader of three infantry divisions in Minas Gerais, had begun active military preparations against the ailing Goulart regime since early 1963. When General Olimpio Mourao arrived in Minas in 1963, Guedes took him to visit the Governor, Magalhaes Pinto, thus setting in motion events that brought about the coup. It seems that the generals were already disenchanted with the politicians (populists) but needed them merely as a constitutional cover to give a sort of legality, a dubious one at that, to their brazen actions. One uncertain variable was General Amauri Kruel, pro-Goulart and

in charge of the very effective Guanabara forces. Once the generals had convinced Kruegel that Goulart intended to create a workers' republic, the success of the coup was assured.

One indication of the military's attitude towards the competitive constitutional order and the civilian politicians was the case of Ranieri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies, who assumed the title of Acting President while the military command actually ruled. Thirteen days after the bloodless coup, the military under President Humberto Castello Branco (Marshal of the army) had assumed total control of the machinery of government.

Q: It has been stated that Brazil depends on the Middle East for 50 percent of its oil and that the successful Arab offensive to force or to persuade black African states to break diplomatic ties with Israel will soon turn to pressure against Portugal, particularly in light of the use of Portuguese bases by American planes which resupply Israel with arms when landing rights were denied in most of Western Europe. Do you see Brazil cooling relations with Portugal as a result of oil pressure or implied oil pressure by the Arab states?

Glasgow: The recent effective use of the oil embargo by certain or most of the Middle Eastern states against the major industrial countries could affect the privileged ties between Brazil and Portugal if the oil producing Arab states and Nigeria agree to extend their oil embargo against Brazil. There is a growing realization among the Nigerian elite that the oil embargo must be used "in the fight against colonialism." Nzo Ekwangaki, secretary-general of the OAU and Nigerian finance minister, views it as a rapid means to the solution of the problem of colonialism. Ekwangaki has invited the members of the Arab league to maintain the boycott against "racist and colonialist regimes." On the African and Near East map, these have been identified as Israel, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Since the Nigerian minister also identifies colonialist regimes as transcending the African continent and since Brazil, a major importer of Nigerian oil, is the chief economic investor in the Portuguese colonies, she (Brazil) is vulnerable to an embargo by the world's eighth largest exporter of oil. Lacking an alternate source of energy supply for her fast developing economy, the



Brazilian economy could grind to an almost complete stop. Would Brazil trade-off her spectacular economic growth for continued support of Portugal in Africa? If, as appears likely, Nigeria gives a subtle or not so subtle ultimatum to Brazil to support the national liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique and to recognize the Republic of Guiné-Bissau, the Portuguese-speaking nation would face a dilemma.

Clearly Brazil must not only remain on the Arabs' and OAU's friendly list so that she can continue to receive supplies of oil, but like Japan, presumably, she will have to implement an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist policy in order to maintain and to expand her circle of friendly African countries. So far the Arabs appear willing to accept Brazil's "equidistance" posture in the Arab-Israel confrontation. Whether they will continue to do so and whether they will form a viable united bloc of oil producing countries with Nigeria must remain unanswered for the moment.

Q: Congressman Charles Diggs, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Africa, recently went on a three-day visit to Brazil to observe possible indications of what he described as a changing policy by Brazil towards Portugal. Do you see any special significance to this visit?

Glasgow: Congressman Diggs' recent visit to Brazil and his analysis of the future of Luso-Afro-Brazilian relations must be seen in the context of oil diplomacy. It does appear that Diggs believes that the emergence of oil as a factor, and an important one at that, opens the door for changes in Luso-Brazilian relations. While the Congressman did not see any specific indicators of change, he believes that African diplomatic pressure on Brazil at this time will achieve some moderation in the historic friendship between the two countries.

Thus, while there is a mood for change in Brasilia, it is not significant enough to bring about a serious break in Luso-Brazilian relations. Recently, one of Brazil's leading newspapers, the Jornal do Brasil, deplored the continuing support for Portugal's outdated African policy. Obviously referring to Brazil's dependence on the Arab countries for 50 percent of its oil imports, the Jornal touched on the raw nerve of Brazil's interests in the

South Atlantic: she will have to improve relations with the Afro-Arab world.

Q: Professor Glasgow, an influential member of the Brazilian establishment, Federal Deputy Adhemar de Barros, Jr., after reading your paper, complimented your analysis, but wished you had given more attention to the bloc in the Brazilian legislature which has been promoting trips to build trade in black Africa and wants to use Brazilian history to build bridges with Portuguese Africa. He also expressed a concern felt by his civilian colleagues and by the military that the PAIGC is essentially Communist, and if it does succeed in its guerrilla struggle in Guiné-Bissau, the port of Bissau will become a Soviet naval base. What are your thoughts concerning these issues?

Glasgow: While there are groups in and out of congress who are resisting the "pull" of cultural and historical ties between Portugal and Brazil in favor of closer ties with Africa and Asia, it would be unwise to attach any influential quality to their views on foreign policy. As presently constituted, the Brazilian military government does not pretend that its foreign policy is influenced by these groups or the press or public opinion. The opinions of outside groups are only effective if they are not too far in advance of existing military thinking. This is not to say that they can only confirm, but rather to emphasize that they can only be effective if they do not get ahead of official views, thus functioning in a narrowly circumscribed area.

But lack of effectiveness should not diminish the practical and innovative ideas of the legislative bloc which refuses to be prisoners of historical events. Cognizant of the unhistorical, impractical juxtaposition between the traditional colonial and crypto-colonial policies and the new challenges facing Brazilian foreign policy, the bloc seeks to remind Brazilians of the African cultural and racial ties and their similar ideas on racial miscegenation and the importance of trade. The presence of large numbers of Afro-Brazilians, the absence of overt racial strife, and Brazil's geographical propinquity with Africa are additional factors, and positive ones, for Brazilian diplomacy.

Congressmen such as Almino Afonso, Adauto Lucio Cardoso, Nogueiro da Gama, and Coelho de Souza have supported closer

identification with Africa in spite of the censures of the "being descended from Portuguese" opposition bloc. Brazilian foreign policy will transcend its outdated colonial policy to the extent that African governments, policymakers, and intellectuals can fashion the types of policies which will force Brazil to depart from the familiar theme of support for Portugal's colonial policies. That is to say, Africans will have to create new directions and cease endorsing Brazilian foreign policy.

There is a valid distinction to be made between what the Brazilian military believes--a value judgment reflecting the psychological burden of their Cold War philosophy--PAIGC will do when it captures the port of Bissau and establishes effective control and what PAIGC will actually do. This communist hysteria seeks to divert attention from the real issue: independence for African countries, which is seen as endangering, if not destroying, Portuguese civilization. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support this charge. I should have said, preposterous charge. One could raise the question, Why didn't the Guineans offer a base to the USSR? It is obvious that Africans will not exchange one colonial and/or imperialist bloc for another.

This concern seems to identify one of the major dilemmas of Brazilian foreign policy--an inability to define what is important and useful. Brazilian standards are in need of redefinition, an updating and orientation away from the Victorian mold.



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